William John Biss was born on 4th March 1887 at 36 Orford Street, Chelsea, London. He was the eldest child of Henry George Biss and Florence Eliza Biss (nee Clemens)
On 5th April 1891 the Census was held. William John Biss was living at 7 Norman Street, Chelsea, London with his parents Henry George Biss and Florence Eliza Biss (nee Clemens) and his brother Alfred Biss.
On 31st March 1901 the Census was held. William John Biss was living at 7 Marlborough Street, Chelsea, London with his parents Henry George Biss and Florence Eliza Biss (nee Clemens) and his siblings, Alfred Biss and Florence Biss and his uncle James Biss.
On 24th November 1906 William John Biss married Lilian Ellen Dudley at St. Peter's Church, Fulham, London. The marriage entry reads;
1906. Marriage solemnized at St Peter's Church in the Parish of Fulham in the County of London
When Married. 24th November 1906 Name and Surname. William John Biss/Lilian Ellen Dudley Age. 19/18 Rank or Profession. Newsagent/- Residence at the time of Marriage. 55 Rostrevor Road/ 55 Rostrevor Road Father's Name and Surname. Henry Biss/ George Dudley Rank or Profession of Father. Newsagent/Hat Manufacture
Married in the Chruch of St Peter according to the Rites and Ceremonies of the Established Church
This Marriage was solemnized between us, {William John Biss/Lilian Ellen Dudley} in the Presence of us, {George Dudley/Henry George Biss
William John Biss and Lilian Ellen Biss (nee Dudley) would go on to have two daughter's, Elsie Vera Biss born 1907 and Gladys F. M. Biss born 1911.
On 2nd April 1911 the Census was held. William John Biss was living at 3 Firth Gardens, Fulham, London, with his wife Lilian Ellen Biss (nee Dudley) and their daughter Elsie Vera Biss. His occupation was as a Newsagent, working for an employer, most likely his father Henry Geroge Biss.
Sometime in the early 1910's William John Biss and his family moved to 27 Edgar Road, Cliftonville, Margate, Kent.
On 14th August 1914 Britain declared war on Germany and so started the First World War.
William John Biss joined the Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment) 7th (Service) Battalion. He was given the army number G/15474.
The 7th (Service) Battalion was formed in Maidstone, Kent on 5th September 1914 as part of K2 and attached to 55th Brigade in 18th (Eastern) Division. Latter on that month the Battalion moved to Purfleet, Essex. In April 1915 they moved again to Colchester, Essex. In May 1915 they were moved to Codford, Salisbury Plain, Wiltshire.
On 27th July 1915 the Battalion set sail from Portsmouth, Hampshire and landed at La Havre, France.
Map of the Western Front 1915-16.
Prior to the British attack at about 0630, 140 tons of chlorine gas was released with mixed success—in places the gas was blown back onto British trenches. Due to the inefficiency of the contemporary gas masks, many soldiers removed them as they could not see through the fogged-up talc eyepieces, or could barely breathe with them on. This led to some British soldiers being affected by their own gas as it blew back across their lines.
The British were able to break through the weaker German defences and capture the town of Loos, mainly due to numerical superiority. However, the inevitable supply and communications problems, combined with the late arrival of reserves, meant that the breakthrough could not be exploited. A further complication for many British soldiers was the failure of their artillery to cut the German wire in many places in advance of the attack. Advancing over open fields in range of German machine guns and artillery, British losses were devastating. When the battle resumed the following day, the Germans were prepared and repulsed attempts to continue the advance. The fighting subsided on 28 September with the British having retreated to their starting positions. Their attacks had cost over 20,000 casualties, including three divisional commanders.
Major-General Richard Hilton, at that time a Forward Observation Officer, said of the battle:
A great deal of nonsense has been written about Loos. The real tragedy of that battle was its nearness to complete success. Most of us who reached the crest of Hill 70 and survived were firmly convinced that we had broken through on that Sunday, 25th September 1915. There seemed to be nothing ahead of us but an unoccupied and incomplete trench system. The only two things that prevented our advancing into the suburbs of Lens were, firstly the exhaustion of the 'Jocks' themselves (for they had undergone a bellyfull of marching and fighting that day) and secondly the flanking fire of numerous German machine-guns, which swept that bare hill from some factory buildings in Cite St. Auguste to the south of us. All that we needed was more artillery ammunition to blast those clearly located machine-guns, and some fresh infantry to take over from the weary and depleted 'Jocks.' But, alas, neither ammunition nor reinforcements were immediately available, and the great opportunity passed.
Among the dead on the British side were Fergus Bowes-Lyon, brother to Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon (later Queen Consort, of George VI and "Queen Mother"), author and poet Rudyard Kipling's son, John, and the poet Charles Sorley.
Several survivors wrote of their experiences. Poet Robert Graves, described the battle and succeeding days in his war memoir Goodbye to All That.[4] Author Patrick MacGill, who served as a stretcher-bearer in the London Irish and was wounded at Loos in October 1915, described the battle in his autobiographical novel The Great Push. James Norman Hall, the American author, related his experiences in the British Army in his first book, Kitchener's Mob.
On the 1st July 1916 the Battle of the Somme commenced. Zero hour was officially set at 7:30 am. Ten minutes prior to zero hour, an officer detonated a 40,000-pound (18,000 kg) mine beneath Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt.
Before the infantry moved, the artillery had been called into action. Barrages in the past had depended on surprise and poor German bunkers for success; however, these conditions did not exist in the area of the Somme. To add to the difficulties involved in penetrating the German defences, of 1,437 British guns, only 467 were heavies, and just 34 of those were of 9.2" (234 mm) or greater calibre. In the end, only 30 tons of explosive would fall per mile of British front. Of the 12,000 tons fired, two thirds of it was shrapnel and only 900 tons of it was capable of penetrating bunkers. To make matters worse, British gunners lacked the accuracy to bring fire in on close German trenches, keeping a safe separation of 300 yards (275 m), compared to the French gunners' 60 yards (55 m)—and British troops were often less than 300 yd (270 m) away, meaning German fortifications were untouched by the barrage. The infantry then crawled out into no man's land early so they could rush the front German trench as soon as the barrage lifted. Despite the heavy bombardment, many of the German defenders had survived, protected in deep dugouts and they were able to inflict a terrible toll on the infantry.
North of the Albert-Bapaume road, the advance was almost a complete failure. Communications were completely inadequate, as commanders were largely ignorant of the progress of the battle. A mistaken report by General Beauvoir De Lisle of the 29th Division proved to be fatal. By misinterpreting a German flare as success by the 87th Brigade at Beaumont Hamel, it led to the reserves being ordered forward
The eight hundred and one men from the 1st Newfoundland Regiment marched onto the battlefield from the reserves and only 68 made it out unharmed with over 500 of 801 dead. British attacks astride the Albert-Bapaume road also failed, despite the explosion of two mines at La Boisselle. Here another tragic advance was made by the Tyneside Irish Brigade of the 34th Division, which started nearly one mile from the German front line, in full view of German machine guns. The Irish Brigade was wiped out before it reached the front trench line.
Overall, the first day on the Somme was a failure for the Allied forces. The British had suffered 19,240 dead, 35,493 wounded, 2,152 missing and 585 prisoners for a total loss of 57,470. This meant that in one day of fighting, 20% of the entire British fighting force had been killed, in addition to the complete loss of the Newfoundland Regiment as a fighting unit.
On the morning of 3 July, the northern part of the front bisected by the Albert-Bapaume road had been a problem for the British, as only a part of La Boisselle had been taken. The road to Contalmaison beyond La Boisselle was important to the British because the town of Contalmaison enjoyed a high position where the Germans protected their artillery, a focal point in the center of the front line. The position south of the Albert-Bapaume road proved to be much more favourable to the advancing British, where they had achieved partial success. The line from Fricourt to Mametz Wood and on to Delville Wood near Longueval was overrun in due course, however the line beyond was more difficult to navigate because of dense forests.
On 14th July 1916 at 3.20 a.m. the British artillery opened their intense bombardment on the German front-line trenches. At 3.25 a.m., when the bombardment lifted to the second-line reserve trenches, the infantry rushed in. The bombardment fell on the reserve trenches for a further two minutes before lifting again. The first wave of British infantry, made up of bombing parties, was to push straight on to the reserve trenches, leaving the following waves to mop up the front-line. Surprise was not complete and in places the German defenders met the advancing infantry with rifle and machine gun fire but elsewhere the garrisons were caught in their dugouts. As on 1 July, the quality of the wire-cutting was variable; sometimes it posed no obstacle, elsewhere the attacking waves got held up and cut to pieces.
At the left, the 21st Division attacked from Mametz Wood, crossing no man's land into Bazentin le Petit Wood. On their right was the 7th Division which, having been faced with over 1,000 yards (900 m) of no man's land to cross, had crept its assaulting battalions within 100 yards (90 m) of the German wire when the bombardment lifted. The 7th Division were faced with a complex of German trenches — Flatiron Trench, Marlboro Trench and The Snout — beyond which lay Bazentin le Grand Wood, but they reached all their objectives. By mid-morning these two XV Corps divisions had captured the village of Bazentin le Petit.
On the right, attacking between Bazentin le Grand and Longueval were the two XIII Corps divisions, left to right, the 3rd Division and the 9th (Scottish) Division. The 9th Division, which also contained the South African Infantry Brigade (in reserve near Carnoy), took Longueval and reached the fringe of Delville Wood which flanked the village but were unable to take the German redoubt at Waterlot Farm.
In the centre, things did not go well for the 3rd Division attacking from Montauban towards Bazentin le Grand. The German wire was uncut and the defenders alert. The German defensive barrage laid down in no man's land missed the assaulting battalions but caught the supporting waves. Typical of the division's fortunes was the 7th Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry (8th Brigade) which lost eight officers and 200 other ranks killed.
Meanwhile the 18th (Eastern) Division, attacking from Bernafay Wood east of Montauban, had successfully captured Trônes Wood.
While progress was slow on the right and the struggle for Longueval continued, XV Corps had control of the Bazentin villages by 9 a.m. and the prospect of a breakthrough loomed. From the Bazentin ridge, the British could look north-east across a shallow valley towards High Wood, beyond which lay the incomplete German third position. There was no sign of the enemy and thick stands of grain indicated terrain only lightly damaged by shellfire, promising good going for cavalry.
Before advancing, the generals decided to reconnoitre; Brigadier-General Potter of the 9th Brigade (3rd Division) and Major-General Watts, commander of the 7th Division, eventually walked almost to the edge of High Wood without a shot being fired. The wood, so it appeared, was empty. However, a request to XV Corps to allow the 7th Division's reserve brigade to take possession of High Wood was rejected. Instead, the cavalry would be used.
The 2nd Indian Cavalry Division had been held in readiness to exploit the breakthrough but it had encamped at Morlancourt, four miles (6 km) south of Albert and would have to negotiate the churned battlefield over which the British had been advancing for the past fortnight. The division was ordered forward at 7.40 a.m. but by midday had only reached Carnoy, close behind the old British front-line. At 12.15 p.m., Fourth Army HQ ordered the 7th Division to advance but the order was immediately countermanded because Longueval had not been cleared and German guns could enfilade the approaches across the valley to High Wood.
Finally, a 7 p.m. in the evening, the cavalry arrived. Two regiments, the 7th Dragoon Guards and the 20th Deccan Horse, passed between Bazentin le Grand and Longueval and charged with their lances against High Wood. Unfortunately, the opportunity for an easy victory at High Wood had passed and the Germans, having regrouped after the shock of the morning, had begun filtering back into the wood. The cavalry were met with artillery and machine gun fire. In the words of 2nd Lieutenant F.W. Beadle, a forward observation officer for the artillery who witnessed the charge:
- It was an incredible sight, an unbelievable sight, they galloped up with their lances and with pennants flying, up the slope to High Wood and straight into it. ... They simply galloped on through all that and horses and men were dropping on the ground, with no hope against the machine guns, because the Germans up on the ridge were firing down into the valley where the soldiers were. It was an absolute rout. A magnificent sight. Tragic.
Meanwhile, the 33rd Division — XV Corps' reserve — had begun moving forward via Fricourt at 2 p.m. and would reach the Bazentin ridge as the cavalry went in. The division had orders to pass through the 21st Division on the next day and continue the advance. The situation that night was confused with senior commanders believing High Wood had been captured. The 100th Brigade of the 33rd Division was ordered to 'consolidate' but while attempting to dig trenches in the southern tip of the wood, it became all too apparent to the brigade's commander that High Wood had not been captured.
Yet, on 15 July, the 100th Brigade was told to form up across the valley, facing north with High Wood on their right flank, and advance towards Martinpuich. Protests to division were ignored and the attack went ahead at 9 a.m. after half an hour of preliminary bombardment. Enfiladed by German machine guns in the wood, the attack got nowhere. One company of the 16th Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps (the Church Lads Brigade Pals battalion), had been given the task of 'clearing' the wood in support of the advance but of the 200 who went in, only 67 came out.
The failure to seize the opportunities of the morning of 14 July proved costly for the Fourth Army. It would take two months of bloody attrition before High Wood was finally captured. Following the loss of the Bazentin ridge, the Germans built a "switch trench", known as the Switch Line, to connect their second position near Pozières with their third position under construction on the next ridge. The Switch Line ran through the northern tip of High Wood and one could not be captured without the other and so it was not until the next major offensive, the Battle of Flers-Courcelette on 15 September, that High Wood and the Switch Line fell.
A similar situation developed at Delville Wood which would change hands a number of times over the following month. Having breached the German second position, attention now turned to the flanks. On the right, after Delville Wood was taken, the villages of Guillemont and Ginchy had to be captured in order to bring the French forces into line. On the left, the German strongpoint of Pozières protected the second position north of the Albert-Bapaume road.The dawn attack of 14 July suggested that the British had discovered the formula for successful battles in trench warfare however subsequent fighting demonstrated that the lessons had not been learnt. The next large Fourth Army attack came on the night of 22 July – 23 July, involving six divisions, but ended in complete failure. Attacks were uncoordinated, artillery preparation was inadequate and the Germans, who had learnt lessons, had adopted a more flexible system of defense, moving away from concentrating defenders in a front-line trench.
On 18 August a British offensive was launched on the sector with three British corps attacking around Guillemont.
The decisive attack came on 3 September with the British 20th (Light) Division and 47 Brigade of the 16th (Irish) Division capturing Guillemont while the British 5th Division advanced on the right, eventually taking Falfemont Farm on 5 September. German units fought to the death in the frontline trenches until overwhelmed. Fusilier Regiment 73 of Lieutenant Ernst Jünger was involved in the defence of Guillemont and in his memoirs, Storm of Steel, he describes the dreadful conditions the Germans had to endure. Regiment 73's history states : "Nobody from 3rd Company can provide a report - all the men were killed, as was every officer". There were 5 survivors of 5th Company Infantry Regiment 76.
The battle is significant for the first use of the tank in warfare.
The final act of the Battle of the Somme was played out between 13 and 18 November along the Ancre River, north of Thiepval. With winter setting in, there was no longer any prospect of a breakthrough.
The opening moves were almost a replay of 1 July, even down to another mine being detonated beneath Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt west of Beaumont Hamel. The 31st Division had attacked Serre on 1 July and four and a half months later, was called on to do it again; the results were similar.
It is difficult to declare the Battle of the Somme a victory for either side. The British captured little more than 7-mile (11 km) at the deepest point of penetration—well short of their original objectives. The British themselves had gained approximately only two miles and lost about 420,000 soldiers in the process, meaning that a centimetre cost about two men.
The Somme was the first real test of this newly raised "citizen army" created following Lord Kitchener's call for recruits at the start of the war.
William John Biss was transfered to Ypres in the early part of 1917.
On 9th April 1917 started the Frist Battle of Arras.
Third Battle of the Scarpe (3–4 May 1917)
After securing the area around Arleux at the end of April, the British determined to launch another attack east from Monchy to try and breakthrough the Boiry Riegel and reach the Wotanstellung, a major German defensive fortification. This was scheduled to coincide with the Australian attack at Bullecourt in order to present the Germans with a two–pronged assault. British commanders hoped that success in this venture would force the Germans to retreat further to the east. With this objective in mind, the British launched another attack near the Scarpe on 3 May. However, neither prong was able to make any significant advances and the attack was called off the following day after incurring heavy casualties. Although this battle was a failure, the British learned important lessons about the need for close liaison between tanks, infantry, and artillery, which they would later apply in the Battle of Cambrai (1917).
It was in this battle that William John Biss sustained injuries and was transfered to the VII Corps Main Dressing Station, based at Ficheux, France, where on 28th May 1917 he died of his wounds.
He was buried at Bucquoy Road Cemetery, Ficheux, France. His Grave/Memorial Reference is I. J. 11. Additional information held by the Commonwealth War Grave Commission is that he was the son of Henry Biss, of Chelsea, London; husband of Lilian Ellen Biss, of 27, Edgar Road, Cliftonville, Margate.
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